The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-the AKP) has been in power over a period of twelve years, having won three successive general elections and most likely to win a fourth one in 2015. This is a unique achievement for a party in a country dominated by political parties of the center-right tradition. None of the previous center-right parties in Turkey have come close to matching the AKP's electoral achievements over seven decades of multi-party democracy. Consequently, many scholars increasingly use the label, "a hegemonic party" to describe the AKP's unrivalled dominance in the current Turkish political system. The present article tries to highlight the multiple and conflicting faces of the AKP and consider certain possible scenarios for the future as Turkey finds itself at a critical juncture, following the Presidential election of August 10, 2014. 2 The election itself marks a momentous occasion with the president being directly elected by the people for the first time in Turkish history, constituting a real challenge to the future of Turkish democracy, for the reasons discussed below.
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In retrospect, the AKP rule can be usefully divided into three distinct sub-periods. The first phase, which broadly covers 2002 and 2007, can be described as the party's golden age. This period was characterized by high and inclusive economic growth, with an annual average of 7.3 percent during 2002-2007, coupled with significant reforms on the democratization front.
Turkish foreign policy based on the notions of soft power and the "zero problems with neighbors." In this era Turkey's role as a mediator in regional and global conflicts was also quite effective. Turkey improved its relations with almost all the countries in its immediate neighborhood. Achievements in the realms of the economy, democratization and foreign policy were mutually re-enforcing processes, all of which were strongly influenced by the process of Europeanization, driven by the prospect of formal EU membership. The AKP of the early, golden age era followed the path of "conservative globalism through the European route." 3 The second phase, which spans from 2007 to 2011, represented a period of relative stagnation.
Although the Turkish economy managed to weather the storm of the global financial crisis reasonably effectively, economic performance was not as impressive as the previous era, especially in a less favorable global financial environment, with an annual average around 3.7 percent during 2007-2011. In the sphere of democratization, the performance was again mixed, with elements of progress co-existing with a certain loss of momentum in the reform impetus, closely associated with the stalemate in the formal negotiation process with the EU and the dramatic decline in Turkey's prospects for full EU membership. Foreign policy during this period became increasingly more assertive and independent, with a strong focus on the Middle East. However, the emergent over-activism was clearly conflicting with one of the underlying aims of foreign policy, namely the desire to play an effective mediating role. 4 The third phase of AKP, from 2011 to 2014, has so far proved to be a period of real decline with the party's performance proving to be deeply disappointing in the three distinct, yet inter-locking policy areas under consideration. The economic performance during the third term of the AKP is much less impressive compared to the earlier phases. Performance indicators gradually point towards a slow and fragile pattern of growth, around an annual average of 4.9 percent with significant risks concerning the prospects of sustainable economic growth. On the democratization front, the overall balance suggests a significant retreat with multiple manifestations of rising authoritarianism. On top of this, the over-ambitious foreign policy joined with the highly volatile regional environment of the Arab Revolutions has brought about a situation where the fortunes of the "zero problems with neighbors" strategy have been dramatically reversed: Turkey experienced severe problems with virtually all its neighbors and found itself increasingly in isolation and encountered serious security risks. 
Authoritarianism in the post-2011 Era
There is growing evidence of a democratic reversal or backslide taking place in Turkey during the latest phase of the AKP era. 6 This makes a strong contrast with the early reformist phase of the ruling party, which under the strong impetus of Europeanization, had resulted in a number of important democratization reforms. By mid to late 2000s, Turkey appeared to be making fine progress in a number of key areas of reform ranging from a radical reordering of civil-military relations and recognition of minority rights, the most notable feature of which involved the extension of language and cultural rights for the Kurdish citizens who constitute almost a fifth of Turkey's population. Yet, steadily and rather paradoxically this democratization impulse appears to have been reversed and has been replaced by an authoritarian turn. Not surprisingly, terms like "illiberal democracy", "hybrid democracy" or "competitive authoritarianism" is frequently used concepts to characterize the latest phase of the AKP rule. It is quite obvious that Turkey needs a new constitution to replace the old constitution of 1982, which was crafted by military regime and contains a number of authoritarian elements. The new constitution is necessary to guarantee the rights and freedom of various groups that make up the Turkish society ranging from religious conservatives to the secularists, Kurds, Alawites and other minorities. 10 Clearly, the formulation of such a new Constitution presents a formidable challenge, given that it requires a considerable degree of compromise and consensus, rather than a majoritarian worldview that favors the position of one dominant group over the others. At the moment the constitutional process appears to have been shelved, but could come into the picture again as part of a push to move Turkey from a parliamentary to a presidential system. This is clearly what Erdoğan wants and would like to push forward as part of his new Presidential role. A move in this direction, however, would be unfortunate.
The shift to a presidential system in the absence of appropriate checks and balances will inevitably accentuate the authoritarian bias and contribute to further monopolization of power at the center. The type of constitutional change that Turkey needs is a change in the opposite direction, which leads to de-concentration of power and forms the basis of a genuinely pluralistic political and social order.
To be fair, there is one important realm where striking progress has been achieved in the latest phase of the AKP era. The AKP and Erdoğan, in particular, have played an important role in instigating the "Kurdish peace process" through direct talks with the imprisoned Kurdish leader Öcalan of the Kurdish Worker's Party, the PKK. In the short-term, the peace process appears to have worked in terms of leading to a ceasefire and the termination of the armed conflict between Turkish armed forces and the PKK in southern Turkey, with such costly consequences in humanitarian process. It remains to be seen, however, whether this process will be firmly institutionalized, leading to a durable peace in the long-term. Again this brings us back to the constitutional discussion. A central challenge is whether the democratic demands of the Kurds, especially on the issue of self-autonomy within a federal structure, will be accommodated through the new constitution. If the Kurdish peace process is simply a tactical move on the part of Erdoğan and the AKP, in terms of changing the constitution towards a presidential system and counting support of the Kurds in the process, this will not be the recipe for achieving a durable peace. In other words, the current situation with the accompanied by genuine reforms to extend the political rights of the Kurdish citizens. Several elements point towards the Gezi protests as a critical turning point in Turkish politics.
First, the protests showed that significant resistance had already been accumulated against Erdoğan and AKP over the past decade, which then burst out and manifested itself as a spontaneous uprising. Second, the process developed independently of organized politics.
Social media was extensively used as a tool of communication and mobilization as in other similar protest movements. Indeed, one could claim that it was the very weakness and fragmentation of the opposition parties like the CHP that created the original vacuum from which spontaneous uprisings from below emerged. The third element was that the Gezi clearly displayed the discontent of secular members of society, especially young people from the Western-oriented, urban and middle class backgrounds in Turkish society with the growing conservatism of Turkish society and the compression of the social and political space as a result of deliberate social and political engineering on the part of the AKP. Gezi reflected the fears of an important segment of Turkish society that the avenues available for them to express their grievances and to practice their own preferred life-styles were being increasingly taken away from them.
Hence, the protests were more than simply a deep concern for the environment or a desire for reclaiming urban public space. Underlying the protests were broader concerns about the direction of Turkish politics and the increasing constraints placed on the practice of genuine pluralism, based on mutual respect of different groups towards one another. At the same time, the Gezi process was important in bringing people from different ethnic, class and cultural backgrounds together. Although the young secular urban groups constituted the over-riding majority, people from religious-conservative backgrounds also took active part. Among the participants, were rather hybrid and unusual groups such as the "Islamic non-capitalists,"
which appeared transcending traditional boundaries such as "conservatism versus secularism"
or "right versus the left". Consequently, the protests generated certain optimism that artificial boundaries or divisions in Turkish society could be overcome by growing human interaction at the grassroots level.
What was also interesting about the Gezi process was that it was a local movement, highlighting deep conflicts over identity, which at first sight appeared to be rather unique to international support, are unlikely to have a lasting impact if they fail to influence the policies of key political parties. In other words, the middle layer, i.e., the national institutional context mediating the local and the global, matters. There is an irony here: It is the very weakness of the political party system in Turkey, namely the asymmetry in the power of the dominant party and the weakness of the parties in opposition that gave rise to the protests in the first
place. Yet, unless these protests are connected with the key layers of the established party system, namely "politics from above," their substantive impact in terms of accomplishing genuine political change is likely to be rather limited.
Reactions from Outside: Why the External Anchors or the Reputation Effects are not working?
The final term of the AKP government constitutes a real test case for the effective functioning of external anchors or reputation effects in the process of reversing democratic decline and revitalizing the process of democratic deepening. There is strong evidence that among the political elites and the policy establishments of the United States and the EU there is a growing disillusionment with elements of rising authoritarianism in Turkey. A number of reports have been published to highlight the dramatic weakening of the democratization impulse in Turkey over the past few years. 14 Criticism has become particularly vocal after the Gezi Park protests. The overly violent and aggressive reaction on the part of Erdoğan and the AKP government at large has generated widespread media coverage and criticism in Western circles. What is quite striking, however, is that the growing criticisms coming from the external world has so far made a very limited impact in terms of counteracting the rising tide of authoritarianism in Turkey's domestic political sphere.
Several explanations may be offered to account for this apparent paradox. First and foremost, the issue of EU membership has lost its credibility both in Europe and in Turkey. There has been a dramatic loss of support for EU membership in Turkey as indicated by several by public opinion surveys. 15 Even the most ardent supporters of Turkey's EU membership bid feel that the best deal that Turkey can obtain is a "special partnership" and this hardly constitutes an exciting prospect given that Turkey is already a "special member" being a part of the Customs Union and the NATO as well as being a participant in many of EU's research and educational programs. There is also widespread consensus in Turkey that even if Turkey undertakes all the required reforms and fulfills the conditionality requirements, at the end of the day it is application bid is likely to be rejected in referenda in key European countries such as France, where there exists deep-seated skepticism considering Turkey's European identity.
Culturally bounded visions of the European Union, where Turkey is considered to be an important outsider rather than a natural insider, have accentuated nationalist sentiments and a parallel sense of Euro-skepticism in Turkey. 16 Secondly, a distinct factor in this context concerns the decline in the appeal of the EU following the euro area crisis with its severely negative consequences in the European periphery, which previously identified as singularly successful examples of EU-driven economic and dramatic transformation. Both Eastern Europe and Southern Europe have been severely affected by the euro crisis. Turkish policy-makers felt all the more confident by the fact that Turkey continued to experience economic expansion and emerged from the global financial crisis in a relatively robust fashion at a time, especially when its neighbor Greece found itself in a dramatic crisis, with its dramatically negative economic and social consequences. The fact that the economic crisis in Europe itself has fuelled islamophobia and anti-immigration sentiments, giving rise to the growing popularity of radical right wing movements in many Western and Eastern European member states appeared to confirm the well-established fears that Turkey would be rejected on cultural or identity grounds, even if
Turkey were to satisfy all elements of the Copenhagen criteria. Hence, the first and the second elements should be seen as interdependent, mutually re-enforcing tendencies, which collectively tend to undermine the enthusiasm for EU membership at home and, which, as a result, help to reduce in a rather dramatic manner, the EU's soft power over Turkey. The contrast is particularly marked in comparison to the early years of the previous decade-the first years of the AKP era-when the EU played a tremendously important role in Turkey's transformation and reform process. Overall, the perception of Europe, which is increasingly pre-occupied with its own economic and identity crises and, therefore, unable to act effectively in the context of major international crises in its immediate neighborhood, such as the crises in Syria and Ukraine, looks increasingly less attractive as a primary target for its foreign policy initiatives, especially in a context where the membership option appears to be less and less credible.
Last, but certainly not the least, major influence concerns the impact of domestic political change in Turkey. A process of profound economic and political transformation has accompanied the AKP era. New conservative economic and political elites, once very much situated in the periphery, now find themselves occupying the very center of Turkish politics. 17 There is now doubt that key segments of "new Turkey" whose influence and power has been growing as part of the AKP's social engineering through education and media are not committed to the West in cultural and identity terms, as it was the case for the previously dominant secular elites. Their approach to Europe or the West is more pragmatic based on economic and security consideration, as opposed to a deep-seated commitment in terms of identity or life-style. It would not be an exaggeration to say that a major component of the new elites is that they tend to be more oriented towards the Middle East and the Islamic world.
They are also increasingly more receptive to growing economic opportunities in Asia, Africa and even Latin America, in a rapidly changing global environment. Hence they can be described, as more are "Euro-Asian" and "global" rather than" European in their broader outlook.
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The emerging "new Turkey" of the AKP era will continue to be important to the West, in a region characterized by instant turmoil. In spite of recent challenges, Turkey continues to be an important regional actor based on its economic and democratic credentials, especially judged by the standards of the Arab Middle East and the non-EU members of wider Europe.
What is important in the present context is that the relationship is more likely to take the form of a loose, flexible partnership. Given the nature of domestic political shifts, coupled with the rise of BRICS and other emerging powers in the changing global context, mean that the West will no longer be the primary anchor or reference point of Turkey's external relations.
Assuming that the AKP continues to maintain its hegemony in domestic politics, Turkish foreign policy will be increasingly multi-dimensional with the West being an important, but not necessarily the pre-dominant component. The result is that the ability of Western actors to have a deep impact on Turkey's domestic politics will be severely restricted, especially in an environment where EU conditionality appears to have lost its practical relevance.
Looking back, Turkey's Western allies and especially the EU should accept a certain degree of self-criticism regarding Turkey's recent democratic reversals. The EU, in particular has failed to help Turkey at critical junctures of reform. Certainly more effort on the part of the key EU states in helping to resolve the Cyprus issue could have created a more favorable environment for Turkey to fulfill the EU's conditionality requirements. The lack of effective and credible incentives meant that the EU could not continue to play the critical transformative role, which it had effectively played in the early stages of the reform process.
There is now a need to think of creative ways of revitalizing Turkey-EU relationship, which is to the long-term advantage of both parties. Given the nature of the current political landscape in Turkey, the major impetus for change needs to come from the EU. What appear to be 
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There are several explanations of this paradox. First, the economic success of the AKP era benefited large segments of the population. New middle classes prospered under the AKP rule.
At the same time, large segments at low levels of income also benefited from a combination of high growth and low inflation. The AKP era was arguably the period where any centerright government displayed the best economic performance over an extended time span, without encountering a serious economic crisis on the way. The benefits of economic expansion and inclusive growth were spread across the country and were inevitably translated into political support for the AKP. The economic impact of the AKP era was evident in a number of different respects whose manifestations were concrete and visible. Particularly striking were the developments in health, education, transport and communications and the provision of public services, particularly at the local level. Growth in the later era was perhaps not as impressive as in the early years of the AKP. Nevertheless, as long as growth continued and people continued to benefit from economic expansion, there were no serious setbacks in the party's popularity. This image of economic improvement during the AKP era was bolstered by the negative perceptions of the pre-2002 era, which was a period of economic and political instability and successive financial crises with costly consequences. That being said, one should not over-exaggerate the economic performance of the AKP governments because, similar to other rapidly emerging economies, economic exclusion went hand in hand with rapid inclusive development. Accordingly, poverty still remains as one of the salient features of Turkish political economy, despite modest improvements in inequality indicators. 20 Turkey also approaches to middle income trap, which necessitates more proactive and inclusive policies in order not to get stuck in the middle-income threshold for a long period of time.
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In retrospect, however, the AKP managed to appeal to large segments of society through a In analytical terms, the concept of the "bounded" or "gated" communities appears to be a useful concept in terms of understanding and highlighting the major democratization dilemmas in Turkey. In extreme versions of bounded communities, a version of tribal politics,
leaders are not open to serious criticism from within. The concept of gated communities, for example, is useful in terms of explaining why serious allegations of corruption failed to make any impact on Erdoğan's or the AKP's popularity in the electoral contest. The key point is that members of the community are not willing to punish a leader who is an insider to the community, especially in an environment where material benefits for all group members are expanding. The central logic is that if the leader is penalized and the party members vote for outsiders, the losses to be accrued would be significantly higher. Thus intra-group trust emerges as a key variable. In extreme versions of bounded or gated communities, group members only trust insiders-members of their own group-whilst there is a total lack of trust towards outsiders. In such an environment, even if there were evidence of corruption or malpractice, group members would refrain from taking such allegations seriously let alone punishing them through their choice in the ballot box, since they would be afraid of losing their hard earned economic and cultural rights as a group during the course of the AKP era.
The notion of gated communities also applies to the principal opposition parties. "Hard-line" secular Kemalists, for example, constitute the hardcore of the CHP. Many members of this group entertain a vision of Turkey, which is strongly oriented towards the West. Such people tend to display a deep skepticism towards conservative-religious segments of society in terms of their life-styles and their basic political and foreign policy orientations. Consequently, these groups are also quite skeptical of more encompassing strategies designed to appeal to religious conservatives, the Kurds or other segments of the Turkish society. 23 Examples of these closed identities become mutually reinforcing and bloc paths towards dialogue and interaction among different segments. In the short-term, the leader of the group uses this situation to his electoral advantage, as Erdoğan clearly illustrated in March and August 2014.
In the longer-term, however, the consequences of this kind of behavior and interaction are detrimental for the performance of the system as a whole, as opposed to its constitutive parts.
Benign versus Pessimistic Scenarios for the Future of Turkish Democracy: the PostPresidential Election Era
The future of hybrid regimes is characterized by a significant degree of uncertainty. It is possible that they may evolve in the direction of democratic deepening and the consolidation of liberal democratic norms. At the same time, it is perfectly possible for such systems to move in the opposite direction and to degenerate into "competitive authoritarianism." There exist considerable grounds for pessimism, following the comfortable victory of Prime
Minister Erdoğan, claiming 52 percent of the popular vote, which enabled him in the midst of a relatively low turn out to win the Presidential race during the first round. 24 Turkey continues to be highly divided and polarized, as it was also the case in the municipal elections of March enthusiasm, an equally large part of the Turkish society, especially the more secular and Western-oriented segments feel deeply disappointed and have fundamental concerns regarding the future course of Turkish democracy. On the part of the opposition, there is also the natural fear that Erdoğan will not be the old-style president acting in a consensual style. It is more likely that he will be a highly pro-active and interventionist President who will use all the powers at his disposal to control his party with the obvious consequence that he will continue to shape the future of Turkish politics and foreign policy. It is perfectly possible that his presidential term may be accompanied by even greater concentration and monopolization of power at the center, which effectively means increasing marginalization of opposition and voices of dissent in Turkish society. The likely outcome of this scenario is an increasingly conservative and homogenized Turkish society, through widespread social and political engineering at even more extensive scale than has previously been the case, with the natural implication that major segments of the population feel increasingly alienated and have little role in shaping Turkey's political future in a pluralistic order.
Whilst a continued drift towards institutionalization of "competitive authoritarianism"
remains a serious possibility, there are also reasons to be more optimistic about the future of Turkish democracy in the medium term, based on the following set of propositions. First, Erdoğan could not win the Presidential race by a sufficient margin to be able to engineer a constitutional reform through the Parliament in the direction of a Presidential system. Given the difficulties of accomplishing a new Presidential system under a new Constitution or constitutional amendment, he is more likely to be forced to operate within the parameters of the existing Parliamentary system. This, in turn, will act as a constraint on his interventionist powers. Second, his ability to control his party from a distance will be curtailed. He will have to work with a new party leader as the new Prime Minister. This may create unexpected problems of conflict and the necessity of power sharing. In the post-Erdoğan phase, it is possible that the AKP may be exposed to new rivalries and growing intra-party competition. It is possible that this may change the course of the party in a more moderate direction, under a different leadership, rather reminiscent of the early reformist era of the AKP rule. Change originating from within the AKP is probably likely to be the most important avenue for revitalizing Turkish democracy, given that the AKP is likely to remain the hegemonic force in Turkish politics for some time to come, barring the possibility of a major economic crisis.
On top of this, Erdoğan in his presidential role may adopt a different perspective. Since he no longer has any elections to win, he could concentrate his energy on issues, which could have widespread appeal to large segments of society, beyond his own electorate. Institutionalizing the Kurdish peace process and achieving a durable peace is likely to emerge as one of his priority objectives in this context. The Presidential office could also be the medium for reconstructing his international popularity, which he seems to have lost in recent years and projecting of a leader who is not simply a successful politician, but display the qualities of a statesman in terms of his ability to resolve major domestic and regional conflicts. This brings us to a central point that currently there is a gap between Turkey's internal democratic deficits and its ambition to play a major democracy promotion role as a leading regional power. Over The fact that a leader of Kurdish origin could stand as a Presidential candidate, and could obtain about ten percent of the vote, was a significant element in its own right. All these factors suggest that new leadership styles may be able to overcome the deep polarization that characterizes the present juncture and move in the direction of a genuinely pluralistic and liberal political order.
